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HOLD FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY 
NOON, THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1966 
COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS BY SEK\TOE MIKE t<lANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
Yeshiva University, New York City, New York 
Thursday, June 16, 1966 
10:30 a.m. 
VIET NAM AND CHINA 
THE SHADOW OF WAR--THE SUBSTANCE OF PEACE 
I welcome the opportunity to share this day with the Class of 
1966. For the most part, you are among ~he last to have been born during 
\.forld War II. Hence, you are among the first to have received the pledge 
of peace of the United Nations in 1945. The preamble to the Charter, you 
will recall, contains this solemn statement of purpose: "To save succeed-
ing generations from the scourge of wa-r:." 
The pledge has stood for twenty-one years. Commencement 
addresses this year might weLl ponder the adequacy of its fulfillment. 
It is a fitting theme for graduating classes, not only in the United 
States, but in the Soviet Union, China, France, Britain, and elsewhere. 
The Class of 1966 has been witness, since birth, not to a grow-
ing peace in the world, but to a procession of crises and conflicts. 
This class has come to maturity in an atmosphere which for two decades 
has been heavy with war and the threat of war. This class graduates 
directly into the face of the bitter war in Viet Nam. 
Yet the words remain: "To save succeeding generations from the 
eoonrge of war." 
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The detonation of the first ato~ic bomb gave to th~~e words a 
great fervor in 1945. The pledge is even more compelling two decades 
later. Today, nuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful, are 
stocked in the arsenals not only of the United States, but of the SoYiet 
Union, the United Kingdom, France and, perhaps now, China . 
At this moment in time, peace is more than an ideal and a hope . 
It is a universal and urgent human necessity. 
The problem of peace is the great preoccupation of the President 
and of the Senate . It is a problem, unfortunately, which grows more, not 
less, difficult with each passing day . Indeed, with respect to Viet Nam, 
we have scarcely begun to delineate the path to peace. We have yet, after 
extraordinary efforts, to begin to devise a formula for the resolution of 
the conflict . 
During the past year, the effort has been made to end the war 
by waging more war and it has not succeeded . For a time, the effort was 
made to end the war by waging less war and that, too, did not succeed . 
The President has pursued negotiations in public. He has searched for 
them in private. He has sought a confE~ence on peace on every highway 
and by-way of international diplomacy. 
But peace remains elusive . The end of the war in Viet Nam is 
not in sight . The question of Viet Nam continues to command our most 
per severing thought . It continues to demand a most honest, restrained 
and thorough public discussion. 
He ovre an unremitting search for a peaceful solution in Viet 
Nam to the young Americans who have gone and who will go to th~t tortured 
land . We owe it to the Vietnamese people who have suffered from the war 
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in great multitudes aud beyond imagining. We owe it to our individual 
consciences and to the collective conscience of the nation. 
Therefore, I address your attention, today, to the problem of 
peace in Viet Nam. I ask you to consider this problem in the context of 
the limbo in which, for more than a decade and a half, have reposed the 
relations between China and the United States. The two questions--peace 
in Viet Nam and peace with China--are very closely interrelated, if not, 
indeed, inseparable. 
In a direct military sense, it is true that China is not presently 
involved in Viet Nam. We have, in fact, bent every effort to assure the 
Chinese that we mean them no harm and that we have no desire to share this 
conflict in Viet Nam with them. We have, in short, sought to avoid military 
engagement with China and, except in accident, so far have avoided it. 
Nevertheless, China is involved in Viet Nam. Chinese participa-
tion is largely indirect, but it is nevertheless a real participation. It 
takes the form of encouragement of Hanoi and the National Liberation Front 
in the south. It includes the supply of war materials which are used 
against Americans and other supporting assistance. 
There is also already an element of direct Chinese participation 
in Viet Nam. Large Chinese labor battalions are at work along the overland 
routes which come into North Viet Nam from China. Americans have been shot 
at and shot down by China, as the war in the air over North Viet Nam has 
skirted the Chinese borders. That is the sort of involvement which already 
prevails. There is every probability, moreover, that the longer the war 
goes on, the greater will become the extent Of Chinese participation. As 
time goes on, an escalating war tends to take on its own relentlessness. 
One-by-one the hatches of avoidance shut down for all concerned. 
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If the Chinese are linked ever more tightly to toe continuance 
of the war in Viet Nam, it seems to me that they are also tied inextricably 
to the question of peace in that nation and in Asia as a whole. I shall 
consider those matters, however, later in my remarks. Let me turn, first, 
to the inner problems of Viet Nam. 
Events of the past few weeks lend to the war an air of bewilder-
ing ambiguity. It is not surprising that they engender a great deal of 
confusion and uncertainty in this nation. 
'He are engaged in war against the North Vietnamese, the Viet 
Cong, and the National Liberation F~ont of the south. But the elements 
of leadership in South Viet Nam who have the greatest stake in that effort 
are engaged in a quasi-war amongst themselves. This inner conflict has 
produced pressures for instability in the south which have little to do 
with the war in which we are engaged. In the light of these pressures, 
it is unrealistic to describe the situation in South Viet Nam in a clear-
cut ideological context . It has never been, in fact, that kind of simple 
situation. 
To view the conflict as wholly one of an aggression of the north 
against the south also does not do adequate justice to the perplexing 
realities of Viet Nam. The war is more than a clash between t'•o nations 
or hostile strangers. It is also a rending of long associated cultures, 
north, central and south, which contain relatives, friends and enemies 
for whom the 17th parallel is a division of dubious significance and 
durability. 
It is illustrative, in this connection, to note that the leader 
of North Viet Nam, Ho Chi Minh, was born much farther south in Viet Nam 
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than the present leader of South Viet Nam, General Ngu.yen Cao Ky. Ho Chi 
Minh, the communist, was educated extensively in what is now anti-communist 
South Viet Nam, while Nguyen Cao Ky, the anti-communist, received his train-
ing in what is now communist North Viet Nam. And if that leaves you con-
fused, think for a moment what ._it must do to the Vietnamese people who must 
live with the confusion. 
What I am suggesting by this digression is that while Viet Nam 
may be two Houses in conflict, it is at the same time one House not only 
divided, but also united in many ways. What I am suggesting, too, is that 
events of the past few weeks represent the surfacing of but a few of the 
complex difficulties of the Vietnamese situation. 
It seems to me that these difficulties have grown more intractable 
and the solutions more difficult since the tragic assassination of President 
Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Coup has followed coup until the count has been lost. 
In the process, the leadership of South Viet Nam has been sundered and 
weakened, the rivalries have grown, the mutual antipathies have increased. 
And, in the process, the Vietnamese people have suffered greatly in conse-
quence of these developments as well as from the war. 
In all frankness, so, too, has this nation suffered from these 
developments. The instability amongst the South Vietnamese leaders has 
meant a steady increase in our involvement in Viet Nam, and especially 
our military role. There is no question that the Armed Services of the 
United States have provided a growing margin of power without which a 
Republic of Viet Nam could not have survived. To them has fallen the 
task of filling the defensive gap left by the growing strains on the 
South Vietnamese authorities. On them has fallen the principal burden 
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of meeting the increased military pressures from the north. These tasks 
which have been assigned to them by the nation's policies have been dis-
charged with great dedication and at great person~ sacrifice. 
The increase in the American effort in Viet Nam has been and 
will continue to be very costly. During the past year and a ho.lf, our 
ground forces commitment has grown from about 25,000 to 267,000. By year's 
end, this figure will be much higher. The deployment of American naval 
and air power has been of a very great magnitude . It has brought to bear 
on Viet Nam the impact of tens of thousands of additional highly trained 
~en who have unleashed a level of destructive power which may approach or 
even surpass that which was set loose during the Korean war . 
At the beginning of 1965, the United States forces were incurring 
casualties at the rate of about 6 per week. Now, upwards of 500 Americans 
are killed and wounded each week. For the past five or six weeks in 
succession, the casualty rate for Americans has surpassed that of the 
South Vietnamese armed forces . 
In monetary terms , the current cost of Viet Nam to the United 
States has been estimated at an annual rate in the neighborhood of $13 
billion and is continuing to rise . In early 1965, the costs were perhaps 
$1 or $2 billion. 
I wish that I could tell you that thjs powerful injection of 
American resources had brought the war nearer to a conclusion. But I 
can only repeat what I said at the outset of my remarks: . the end of the 
war in Viet Nam is not in sight . 
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It has been suggested of late--perhaps inferred i L uore accurate--
that the war can be ended quickly by a further expansion of tha American 
military effort and, particularly, by more and better-placed bombing. 
That is an appealing suggestion, and I have no doubt that it will be heard 
more frequently between now and November. It wraps up, in one simple 
thought, a criticism of the present political leadership, a promise of a 
less painful war, an expectatiOn of victory at a relatively small increase 
in cost. In short, it suggests that there is an easy exist. Let us under-
score one point, here, today: There are easy ways to plunge more deeply 
into this situation; there are no easy ways out of this situation. 
I have just illustrated the extraordinary expansion of the 
American military effort--including bombing--in the past year and a half. 
Before going further along that path, it would seem to me that we have a 
great responsibility to pause and, first, consider carefully the point to 
which this path has led. I can assure you that the politically responsible 
leadership of the nation in the person of the President is not unmindful 
of this responsibility. There is, indeed, a most profound concern as to 
where this course has led and where it may yet lead. 
\fhen the sharp increase in the American military effort began 
in early 1965, it was estimated that only about 400 North Vietnamese 
soldiers were among the enemy forces in the south which totalled 140,000 
at that time. Today, the overall size of the enemy in the south has in-
creased to 250,000 of whom at least 30,000--a very conservative estimate--
are considered to be North Vietnamese regulars. One source suggests that 
if local Viet Cong battalions which operate within their own provinces 
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are excluded from the total, the northerners make up appro: i~tely one-
half of the disciplined professional enemy soldiers in So~th Viet Nam and 
may well constitute two-thirds by year's end. 
Shortly after the outset of the expansion of the military effort, 
it was believed that about 1,500 North Vietnamese were crossing ~he border 
each month. Just a few months ago, the maximum potential infiltration was 
thought to be about 41 500 per month. But infiltration has recently been 
reported in the press to be at a current rate well in e>:ces s of this figure· 
The field of battle was confined largely to South Viet Nam when 
the expansion of our military effort began. Air and sea bombardment has 
now extended the arena of con~~ict throuchout almost all of North Viet 
Nam. The war has spread sharply into Laos. More and more, it verges on 
Cambodia and threatens to spill over into TI.3Jlatld. And as I have already 
mentioned, American planes have been shot at and shot down on or across 
the borders of China. 
vlliatever constructive achievement has resulted from this expan-
sion, the fact must also be faced that the search for peace by intensifica-
tion of war has begotten, not peace, but a further intensification of war. 
The expansion of the arena of conflict has yielded, not peace, but further 
expansion of the arena of conflict. 
Is the war, then, to continue to intensify? Is Viet Nam--north 
and south--to be reduced to a charnel house amidst smoking, silent ruins? 
Indeed, is that to be the fate of great areas of Southeast Aoia and reeions 
be;w:>nd7 
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Experience requires us to recognize that this danger exists in 
the conflict. Prudence compels us to recognize, moreover, that the 
terminal point may not be reached until and unless the war has involved 
China directly. That possibility, it seems to me, should be faced sooner 
rather than later. We should examine it, now, while there is yet time to 
examine it in good sense and soberness. We should examine it, now, rather 
than wait until the actual ity is confronted in the heat of some accident, 
miscalculation or misunderstanding or at the end of thRt long drift which 
ends in inescapable military con'Jel' gence, 
Certainly, the experience of Korea counsels us to examine this 
question without delay and, in so doing, to lay aside the distorting prism 
of wishful thinking. It wi.ll be recalled that a war between Koreans--
north and south--a decade and a half ag:>, became in the end what few 
expected at the beginning, It became, substantially, a war between the 
United States and China. And you will recall, too, that in the end peace 
was not restored to Kor ea by victory but by a truce which required the 
agreement of the United States and China. 
The question must be asked here as well as in Peking. It must 
be asked now . Can peace be restored in Southeast Asia, as it was not in 
Northeast As ia, befoTe, rather than after , a military clash7 Can there 
be a turning off from thz course of collision and onto the road of settle-
ment before, rather than after, the crash7 
I can give you no assurances on these questions . The answers 
depend not only on our wnsdom and restraint but also on that of the 
Chinese. I can only stress to you that the relentless search for affirma-
tive answers is a most solemn responsibility which rests especi.ally upon 
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the leadership of this nation and of China but concerns also the United 
Nations, the Geneva powers, and the entire world. 
There is little doutt that this search is ha~ered by the long 
hiatus in United States relations with China. It is a decade and a half 
since the Chinese revolution and the Korean conflict which followed it. 
In all these years, little of consequence was done to close the deep void 
which these shattering events blasted between the peoples of the two nations. 
On the contrary, the seeds of hostility and suspicion were scattered widely 
and in both countries. The weeis of a mutual distrust were encouraged to 
grow high in both countries. The direct human contact between the world's 
most populous nation and the world's most powerful was reduced to formal 
and routine meetings in Warsaw between an American and a Chinese Ambassador 
which, over the years, have averaged out to about one a month. 
In the last few •reeks members of the Administration have sought 
to make clear in public statements that this nation seeks to restore some 
"bridges" to China. That is a helpful initiative. It is also useful to 
lower our rigid self-imposed t:avel and other barriers which the Executive 
Branch is now doing. 
These acts accord with the nation's interest and they are most 
certainly meaningful gestures in the direction of peace. That the Chinese 
greet these efforts with unabated hostility does not change their validity. 
In the present state of Chinese-United States relations, all acts are 
suspect. All doubts are magnified. All fears are exaggerated. These 
acts , nevertheless, remain proper and modest acts which may one day 
redound to the benefit of both nations. That is all they are and they 
ought not to be regarded as anything more. 
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They do not, certainly, go to the core of the current danger 
which lies in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. Indeed, the relevance of these 
acts must necessarily remain dubious, at least until that danger is faced 
and begins to abate. 
vfuat is needed most, at this time and in the light of that danger, 
is an initiative for a direct contact between the Peking government and 
our own government on the problem of peace in Viet Nam and Southeast Asia. 
This problem is of such transcendent importance, it seems to me, that it 
is a fit question for face-to-face discussion between China and the United 
States at the highest practicable level. Our Secretary of State, Dean 
Rusk, confronted the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, across the 
Conference table at Geneva in 1961-62. It may be that a similar meeting 
now would be useful in this critical situation. 
The meeting could be confined to the two nations, or it could 
include all the belligerents in Viet Nam. It could include the nations 
of the Southeast Asian mainland since they all lie in the swath of the 
war's spreading devast!ttion. It seems to me that there are many possible 
and acceptable alternatives insofar as participation and arrangement are 
concerned. 
The membership and mechanics of the conference are not key issues. 
History will not be gentle with those who pursue the shadow and evade the 
substance of peace. It will not view with sympathy those who stand too 
much on ceremony or who insist too much on face as the price of coming to 
grips with its profound problems. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 40, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 12 -
An Asian conference, at this time, cannot drav a distinction 
betveen victor and vanquished in this conflict, any more than it vas 
possible to do so in the Korean settlement. All vin by peace; all lose 
by the var's continuance. 
Hhat a conference at this time must be concerned vith is, in 
the first instance, a curb on the expansion of the war and a prompt and 
durable termination of the tragic bloodletting in Viet Nam. 
It must be concerned vith insuring a choice free of coercion 
of any kind to the people of South Viet Nam over their future and on the 
question of the reunification of Viet Nam. 
It must be concerned with how the independence and the territorial 
integrity, not only of Viet Nam, but of other small nations of Southeast 
Asia can be safeguarded in Pt~ce. 
It must be concerned, finally, with how foreign bases and 
foreign military forces can be promptly withdrawn and excluded from 
Viet Nam and other parts of the Southeast Asian mainland . 
These are fundamental questions. Answers to these questions 
must begin to be found . And, in the last analysis, they must be con-
curred in by China and the United States . Those are the essentials if 
the conflict in Viet Nam is to end and if a reasonable and stable peace 
is to be established in Southeast Asia. 
Let me make clear that I am not sanguine as to the possibilities 
that these questions will be faced in conference in the near future. Even 
less is it to be expected that answers to these questions are going to be 
found very quickly . The chasms are deep . The walls are high. 
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Nevertheless, at some point, these questions will have to be 
faced and answers will have to be found. It seems to me that we must 
continue to try to take those first faltering steps toward peace in Asia. 
We must try to take them, now, before the tragedy, which is Viet Nam1 is 
compounded many times over. That is the great responsibility. It rests 
on the Chinese. It rests on this nation. It rests, finally, on all the 
nations of the world. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 43, Folder 40, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
